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DENSE INSENSIBILITY
Humean Vices and Virtues
in the
Work of Jane Austen
E. M. Dadlez

t is a truth universally acknowledged that a philosopher
with an appreciation of moral perspicacity must harbor
some weakness for the works of Jane Austen. Rumor has
it, for instance, that Gilbert Ryle, when asked if he still read novels,
promptly responded: "Yes, all six every year," referring to those very
works.' And many academics, though most of them are not philoso
phers, have commented at length on the moral content of Austen's
writing.^ The central questions for those attempting an ethical analysis
of Austen's work are not about the particular philosopher with whose

' Natalie Tyler, The FriendlyJane Austen: A Well-Mannered Introduction to a Lady of Sense and
Sensibility (New York: Viking, 1999), 205.
^ All examples of Austen's work will be derived from the following editions of her novels:
Emma, afterword by Graham Hough (New York: Signet, 1980); Lady Susan/The Watsons/Sanditon, ed. Margaret Drabble (New York: Penguin, 1974); Mansfield Park,afterword by
Marvin Mudrick (New York: Signet, 1964); Northanger Abbey, afterword by Elizabeth
Hardwick (New York: Signet, 1980); Persuasion, afterword by Marvin Mudrick (New York:
Signet, 1964); Pride and Prejudice, ed. Tony Tanner (New York: Penguin, 1972); Sense and
Sensibility, ed. Ros Ballaster (New York: Penguin, 1993).
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ethical theories and systems Austen was most familiar, simply because
there is little evidence of any such familiarity. Gilbert Ryle suggests that
exposure to the writing of Lord Shaftesbury may have simultaneously
exposed Austen to "Aristotelian oxygen,"' but there is no evidence of
Austen's having undertaken researches in philosophy. In fact, David
Gallup informs us that Jane Austen "disclaimed any knowledge of
science and philosophy, belittling herself as a woman without a classical
education 'who knows only her own mother tongue & has read very
little in that.'"* While Gdlup regards this as an exaggeration, he
concedes that Austen's writings are devoid of classical and philosophical
allusion.We cannot assume that Austen read or reflected on philosophy
without indulging in baseless speculation. We can, however, make
perfectly reasonable assumptions about the theories and systems into
which the ethical endorsements made in her works best fit.
For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that novels can
and do make ethical endorsements. Most heavy-handedly, they may do
so by means of the pronouncements of an overly conscientious
omniscient narrator, but this is a literary crudity in which Austen
herself did not indulge. Typically, we take works to endorse one course
of action over another when it is made clear in a variety of ways that
this course of action is right in the world of the work, without its being
explicitly mentioned. I say "variety" because there isn't a single way in
which a reader is nudged into approving a character's course of action,
or simply led to understand that the course of action is hem% presented
as correct. The whole of an artist's repertoire can be mustered in aid of
making it fictionally the case that a given course is right. The author
may describe positive consequences of that course of action. She may
endow the fictional agent with admirable character traits, or with a
feeling of moral satisfaction upon having embarked on the course in
question. Sentiments of approval on the part of laudable characters may
be dwelt on. The story's villains may disapprove of the protagonist's
actions. There are many other possibilities. Any combination of such
textual features could comprise an endorsement, not necessarily of a
' Gilbert Ryle, "Jane Austen and the Moralists," in Critical Essays on Jane Austen, ed. B.C.
Southam (London: Routledge 8e Kegan Paul, 1968), 122.
* Letter 132 (D) December 11, 1815, in Jane Austen's Letters, 3rd ed., D. Le Faye (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995). Cited in David Gallup, "Jane Austen and the Aristotelian
Ethic," Philosophy and Literature 23 (1999): 106.
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course of action in general, but at least of a course of action undertaken
in the kind of context the fiction depicts. That is, a given action might
be depicted as permissible in some contexts, but not in contexts in
which it injures or has other unfortunate consequences. This is a simpleminded truth which fictions are perfectly fitted to illustrate.
Austen's works taken as a whole, as do most works of fiction,
endorse particular perspectives on the rightness and wrongness of
various courses of action in various contexts. They endorse a distinctive
view of human nature, and particularly of human foibles. These
perspectives may be thought to converge more closely with one
philosopher's ethical system than they do with another's. I will
maintain that they undeniably and obviously converge with views
concerning human nature and morality put forward by David Hume in
Books II and III of his Treatise of Human Nature}

I will begin by criticizing a selection of alternative approaches which
ahgn Austen's ethical endorsements with the ethical perspectives of
Hobbes, Kant, and Aristotle. These are not the only alternatives
available, but have appeared most frequently in the literature and are
most often alluded to in work that addresses this topic. I will argue that
Hobbesian and Kantian interpretations of Austen's perspective are
simply mistaken. Aristotelian interpretations are broadly apphcable,
but are compatible with theories whose principal focus has nothing to
do with behavioral dispositions. That is, I will argue that Aristotelian
perspectives on Austen turn out not to be exclusively Aristotelian. Nor
should this besurprising, for it is hardly unusual for ethicists sometimes
to concur, especially with Aristotle. This is not true of Kant, as it
happens, but Kant (as has been indicated) is not in the running.
A kind of Hobbesian reading of Austen seems to be offered by
Avrom Fleishman in his A Reading of Mansfield Park in a passage that
has been cited by more than one author: "If this war of ego is carried
out by each against all, society is indeed as Hobbes described it, helium
' David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1978).
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omnia in omnes. Yet for Jane Austen the amazing fact about this
struggle is its constancy and continuity: society is permanent organized
hostility, and for better or worse it is the only permanence we can
attain."^ Anne Crippen Ruderman discusses this in tandem with Harold
Bloom's contention that Austen "writes about the triumph of the will"
and the sustenance of individuality and individual integrity/ It is true
that Austen's heroines are occasionally placed in positions in which
social pressures are at odds with individual preference or in which a
sense of obligation to family and friends clouds individual judgment.
Persuasion is a prime example of the latter. But none of this makes it the
case that Austen's novels endorse an egoist stance, be that stance
Hobbesian or Nietzschean or Machiavellian. Indeed, I cannot believe
that any such notion was at the heart of the claims just canvassed.
The absurdity of such suppositions becomes evident when we
consider that almost every character in Austen whose behavior is
condemned rather than endorsed is an egoist of one stripe or another.
In fact, what amoimts to a declaration of egoism as an ethical posi
tion—the conviction that moral dxily prescribes acting first in one's own
interest—is (with some humor) ascribed to just those characters who, if
not cast as outright villains, are clearly depicted as "wanting" in the
moral arena. The infamous Mr. Elliot of Persuasion,eventually exposed
as calculating, insincere, and deceitful, has it said of him that '"To do
the best for himself,' passed as a duty."' The more entertaining but
nonetheless selfish Mary Crawford oi Mansfield Park says to the shocked
Fanny Price that "It is everybody's duty to do as well for themselves as
they can" when discussing mercenary motives in marriage.' And the
soon-to-be dissolute Maria Bertram, whose actions are clearly con
demned in the world of Austen's work, makes an obligation of
potential advantage: "Maria Bertram was beginning to think matrimony
a duty; and as a marriage with Mr. Rushworth would give her the
enjoyment of a larger income than her father's...it became, by the same

'Avrom Fleishman, A Reading ofMansfield Park (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1967), 80.
' Anne CrippenRuderman, ThePleasures ofVirtue: Political Thought in the Novels ofJaneAusten
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995),2. Harold Bloom, "Introduction" to Modem Critical
Views: Jane Austen (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986), 2.
' Austen, Persuasion, 192.
' Austen, Mansfield Park,226.
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rule of moral obligation, her evident duty to marry Mr. Rushworth if
she could."'®
When it comes to the imposition and exertion of one's own will
and the triumph of that will over those of others, none fits the case so
well as the eponymous anti-heroine of Lady Susan, an almost caricature
villainess who lies, seduces, and sometimes appears to connive at the
death of inconvenient people; "I am tired of submitting my will to the
caprices of others—of resigning my own judgment in deference to those,
to whom I owe no duty, and for whom I feel no respect."" Lady Susan
says this after her plan to force her daughter to marry a wealthy idiot
has been foiled and her plan to deceive her relatives about her own
motives has been exposed. She is, in fact, a forerunner of Thackeray's
notorious Becky Sharp. Her delight in imposing her own will on others
is humorously cast in the worst possible light: "There is exquisite
pleasure," she says, "in subduing an insolent spirit, in making persons
pre-determined to dislike, acknowledge one's superiority."" The singleminded pursuit of personal interests and the further classification of
such pursuits as virtues and duties are most often held up for scorn in
Austen's work, as are egregious impositions of the will. No form of
egoism can be associated with the ethical stance endorsed in Austen's
novels.

^ II *
A rather better case can be made for Kant. It could be argued, mainly
by those who use Mansfield Park's rule-abiding Fanny Price as their
example, that the ethical viewpoint of Austen's work may coincide
with a Kantian deontological perspective. Fanny Price is Austen's most
priggish and conservative heroine. She is the conscience of Mansfield
Park. Her principled opposition to such activities as amateur theatricals
is inevitably echoed in the endorsements and condemnations made by
the work as a whole. In regard to family members and friends engaged
in organizing the performance of a play, "Fanny looked on and listened.

" Austen, Mansfield Park,32-33,
" Austen, Lady Susan, 98.
" Austen, Lady Susan, 52.
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not unamused to observe the selfishness which, more or less disguised,
seemed to govern them all....For her own gratification she could have
wished that something might be acted, for she had never seen even half
a play, but everything of higher consequence was against it."" Edmund
Bertram, soon to become a member of the clergy, concurs with her
every objection. So, when Edmund begs Fanny to approve of his
participation in the play (something allegedly forced on him by a need
to keep the cast of players more or less within the family), Fanny
cannot give it, even though she understands his reasons. She is particu
larly distressed by Edmund's inconsistency, something that fits quite
effectively into a Kantian analysis:"After all his objections—objections
so just and so public! After all that she had heard him say and seen him
look, and known him to be feeling. Could it be possible? Edmund so
inconsistent. Was he not deceiving himself? Was he not wrong? Alas!""
Edmund's inconsistency may be more disturbing to Fanny than any
outright violation of rules. He wishes to make an exception of himself.
His own participation in the play is seen as being forced on him by
circumstances, whereas the actions of other participants (with the
possible exception of Mary Crawford) are still regarded by him as
wrong. Edmund's proposed participation would certainly fail any
consistency test imposed in the course of applying the categorical
imperative, which requires him to will the maxim of his action to be a
universal law. He cannot will one thing for himself and another for
others.
David Kaufman compares Austen to Kant, citing Sense and
Sensibility's example of Elinor Dashwood's keeping a promise at great
emotional cost, presumably intending an allusion to Kant's edict about
adherence to perfect duties." Upon discovering that the man Elinor
loves has been engaged to another, her sister Marianne demands to
know how long Elinor has been aware of this. Elinor responds:

" Axwten, Mansfield Park, 105.
" hasten, Mansfield Park, 124.
" David Kaufman, "Law and Propriety, Sense and Sensibility: Austen on the Cusp of
Modernity," £i//59 (1992): 385-408.
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"I have known it these four months. When Lucy first
came to Barton-park last November, she told me in confi
dence of her engagement."
"Four months!"—cried Marianne...."So calm!—so
cheerful!—how have you been supported?"
"By feeling that I was doing my duty.—My promise to
Lucy, obliged me to be secret. I owed it to her, therefore, to
avoid giving any hint of the truth; and I owed it to my family
and friends, not to create in them a solicitude about me,
which it could not be in my power to satisfy."'^
Here, Elinor may be said to be acting from a good will—she acts as she
does just because she believes she ought to do it, despite a natural
inclination to confide in her sister and mother. Kant indicates that "the
good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or
because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only
because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself."''^ It is more obviously
evident to a third party that Elinor acts from a good will just because
duty prompts her to act against her inclination. It is, in other words,
easier or safer to ascribe moral merit to those who act against their own
desires, since only duty is left to prompt their action. This may have
inspired Kaufman's references to Elinor Dashwood's masochism. It is
also worth noting that, in line with the preceding, characters like
Northanger Abbey's Catherine Moreland distrust the morality of their
actions most when those actions are in accord with their own inclina
tions."
Returning once more to Mansfield Park, we also discover that, as
Anne Ruderman contends, "Fanny's taste for natural beauty is
presented as a sign of her moral disposition,"" something that can
clearly be linked to Kant's belief that "to take an immediate interest in
the beauty of nature (not merely to have a taste in judging it) is always
a mark of a good soul; and that, when this interest is habitual, it at least
indicates a frame of mind favorable to the moral feeling if it is volun" Austen, Senseand Sensibility, 221.
"Immanuel Kant,Foundations oftheMetaphysics ofMorals,ed. Robert Paul WolflF (Indianapolis;
Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 12.
" Austen, Northangpr Abbey,87.
" Ruderman, The Pleasures ofVinue, 82.
'

154

1650-1850

tarily bound up with the contemplation of nature." Further, "he who
takes such an interest in the beauties of nature can do so only in so far
as he previously has firmly established his interest in the morally good.
If, therefore, the beauty of nature interests a man immediately, we have
reason for attributing to him at least a basis for a good moral disposi
tion."^" A number of Austen's heroines, Fanny Price in particular, have
a greater sensitivity to nature than their fellows. Indeed, the moral
superiority of Fanny Price over Mary Crawford is established when
Fanny's interest in the natural landscape is contrasted with Mary's
inattention: "Miss Crawford was very unlike her. She had none of
Fanny's delicacy of taste, of mind, of feeling; she saw nature, inanimate
nature, with little observation; her attention was all for men and
women."^' Austen frequently has Fanny rhapsodize over starry skies
and sylvan landscapes in a manner reminiscent of Kant's reflections on
the sublime: "Here's harmony....Here's repose! Here's what may leave
all painting and all music behind, and what poetry can only attempt to
describe. Here's what may...lift the heart to rapture! When I look out
on such a night as this, I feel as if there could be neither wickedness or
sorrow in the world; and there certainly would be less of both if the
sublimity of Nature were more attended to, and people were carried
more out of themselves by contemplating such a scene.
But, although there are some correlations between Austen's and
Kant's thoughts about the appreciation of nature, this mainly shows
that both Austen and Fanny Price are creatures of their era. Philoso
phers other than Kant, Burke in particular, wrote about the sublime.
Indeed, "by the second third of the eighteenth century, the term was
firmly entrenched, both as an adjective and as a noun. Every man of
taste...had at his fingertips a catalogue of examples—volcanos, raging
seas, towering cliffs,...blasted heaths and so forth."^^ We are, after all,
considering a time period during which the work of William Words
worth introduced an attitude toward nature that "amounted to a fresh
view of the organic relation between man and the natural world,
and...culminated in metaphors of a wedding between nature and the
" Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951)
42:141,143.
Austen, Mansfield Park, 66.
" Austen, Mansfield Park, 91.
" Mary Mothersill, "Sublime," A Companion to Aesthetics (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), 407.

Dense Insensibility

155

human mind, and beyond that, in the sweeping metaphor of nature as
emblematic of the mind of God."^^ Austen's work could more accu
rately be said to reflect her exposure to the romanic poets than the
thought of Kant. Nor is Kant the only philosopher to draw a connec
tion between aesthetic and moral sensibility. We see such connections
in the work of David Hume, for instance, so this ground for a Kantian
reading of Austen is insufficient.
As for the principled, absolutist judgments of Fanny Price, it isn't
clear how distinctively Kantian they are. Her distress at Edmund
Bertram's inconsistency is prompted to a great extent by jealousy of
Mary Crawford's inflfience on him. And Edmund's inconsistency is,
after all, nothing more than hypocrisy. This is the kind of failing that
proves blameworthy from any number of ethical perspectives quite
distinct from that of the Kantian. Moreover, Fanny's objections to the
family's engaging in amateur theatricals are based on a number of
considerations, none of which seems exclusively recognizable from the
perspective of a Kantian ethical system. The content of the play, for
instance, is seen as sexually improper, especially where the female
characters are concerned, so that acting out those parts would involve
the actors in suggestive conduct. But there is much more to Fanny's
objection. First, any such performance would be strongly condemned
by the stem Sir Thomas Bertram, the owner and authority of Mans
field, who is conveniently absent while the plans are being made.
Second, the project is expensive, and it is at Sir Thomas's expense (the
very person who would most disapprove) that the production is
mounted. Moreover, the conduct that the content of the play encour
ages exacerbates vulnerabilities in such a way as to bring about fairly
disastrous results in the long run for at least one person. Fanny's
disapproval isn't based only on some single principle (adherence to the
known preferences of the pater familias, say) or tied to some explicit
violation of the categorical imperative. There is a general sense of
trouble brewing that Fanny finds distressing: prospective anger and
disapproval from Sir Thomas, mounting expenses, annoying visitors,
importunate amateur thespians, Edmund's attraction to Mary,
increasingly desperate flirtations, people caring less and less about one

" "Wordsworth, William," The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc., 1995), v. 12,753.
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another's feelings. It does not bode well for the future, and Fanny
knows it. Of course she doesn't approve. But that need not make her a
Kantian.
Neither is it clear that Elinor Dashwood acts exclusively from a
good will in keeping Lucy's engagement to Edward secret and thereby
keeping her own promise. Ruderman, a strong supporter of an
Aristotelian interpretation of Austen, argues that "real virtue is never
masochistic in the novels, and...Austen, unlike Kant, goes out of her
way to show how virtue benefits the doer."^^ Elinor is, in many
respects, better ofif if she doesn't spill the beans. Her mother and sister
are not notable for their emotional restraint, and the end result of any
confidences would saddle Elinor with their distress (at the news of the
secret engagement) as well as her own to tranquilize and to cope with.
Elinor is glad to have spared those dear to her "from knowing how
much...[she] felt"^' and thus from feeling distress on that account. She
is also glad to prevent a situation in which her own unhappiness is
exacerbated by the misery of those she loves. Likewise, Catherine
Moreland does right by doing what she wants, and it seems unlikely
that a little insecurity about having rectitude dovetail so conveniently
with one's desires is enough to convict her of a Kantian attitude.

* III *
The strongest arguments in the hterature at present for Austen's
affiliation with a particular philosophical stance are those which make
comparisons between her ethical intuitions and those of Aristotle.
Ruderman, who has devoted a book to her argument, quotes Alisdair
Maclntyre's pronouncement that "when Jane Austen speaks of
'happiness' she does so as an Aristotelian."^ As has already been
indicated, Gilbert Ryle argues that familiarity with Shaftesbury may
have exposed Austen to Aristotelian ideas.^' Recent work on the general

" Ruderman, The Pleasures of Virtue, 6.
" Austen, Sense and Sensibility, 221.
" Alisdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Indiana: University of Notre
Dame, 1981), 223. Cited in Ruderman, The Pleasures of Virtue, 6.
" Ryle, "Jane Austen and the Moralists," 118-19.
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topic of Austen and Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and vice has been
done by David Gallup and Thomas Williams.
As indicated earlier, I do not intend to contest the claim that
Austen's works embrace an Aristotelian conception of happiness and of
virtue as it is thought to relate to happiness. Much of the effectiveness
of Austen's novels rests on her depiction of distinctive behavioral
dispositions which can naturally be linked to an Aristotelian account of
virtue. Harold Bloom once said that, "like Shakespeare, [Austen] gives
us figures, major and minor, utterly distinct each in his or her own
mode of speech and being, and utterly different from one another."^' In
other words, one of Austen's real gifts, the one most closely related to
her reputation for ethical perspicacity, involves her ability to describe
behavioral dispositions and habits of response so as to make them
wholly believable and wholly accessible to us as the virtues and vices
that they are. The single most philosophically convincing Aristotelian
analysis of Austen is offered by David Gallup, who points out that the
Aristotelian flavor in her novels was detected as early as 1821 by a
perceptive reviewer.'®
Like Aristotle, Austen regards happiness as "rational activity in
practicing the...human excellences of character and intellect," something
for the achievement of which both believe a "moderate degree of well
being is required." This is explicit in the Nicomachean Ethics, and
perfectly illustrated in an interchange between Elinor and Marianne
Dashwood of Sense and Sensibility. When Marianne demands to know
what grandeur and wealth have to do with happiness, Elinor replies that
grandeur has little to do with it, but wealth has much." Gallup
convincingly juxtaposes passages from the Nicomachean Ethics about the
practical intellect and about the importance to virtue of practice and
habituation with passages from Austen which illustrate those very
points, or which contrast characters' theoretical professions with their
actual performance. The former is most aptly illustrated by a selection
from Pride and Prejudice in which Darcy's avowed lack of talent "in
conversing easily with those [he]...has never seen before" is wittily
compared by Elizabeth to her limited musical talent, for the limitations

® Tyler, The Friendly Jane Austen, 1.
" Gallup, "Jane Austen and the Aristotelian Ethic," 98.
" Gallup, "Jane Austen and the Aristotelian Ethic," 98.
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of which she holds herself liable, because she hasn't taken the trouble
to practice.'^ Contrasts between theoretical professions and actual
performance are everywhere in Austen. She is at her most devastating
when entertaining herself at the expense of hypocrites.
But, of course, Aristotle's is not the only moral system which
provides insights into distinctions between professed moral positions
and actual practice, or which advocates a mean between extremes. I
believe that Gallup is correct in claiming that Austen's perspective is in
many respects Aristotelian. I just want to argue that such a perspective
in itself has not a little in common with that of David Hume, and that
acknowledging an Aristotelian flavor in Austen's work is not to deny
an even more distinctive Humean quality.
Ruderman, also, is entirely correct in her contentions about the
intrinsic pleasantness of moral conduct in Austen,^' about the usual
compatibility of prudence with the other virtues, about happiness as an
aim of virtuous individuals. We see these things as often in Austen as we
do in Aristotle. We see them when her heroines choose respect and
affection over rank and prestige, as when Anne Elliot chooses Captain
Wentworth over Mr. Elliot. We see them when Austen's heroines
choose for themselves the lives they believe will make them happiest
rather than lives of self-sacrifice which will relegate them to caretaker
status. Anne Elliot doesn't remain at her needy sister's beck and call.
Fanny will not care for Lady Bertram's pugs in perpetuity. Emma
Woodhouse does not continue as the sole caretaker of her querulous
father. But all three choose their own ultimate good without thereby
depriving others. Anne's sister Mary Musgrove has recourse to her
immediate family. Lady Bertram is contented by the arrival of Fanny's
sister, who is pleased to become a denizen of Mansfield. A fortuitous
poultry-house robbery leads the timid Mr. Woodhouse to develop a
keen "sense of his son-in-law's protection" without which "he would
have been under wretched alarm every night of his life."'* These are all
compromises, perhaps even the mean between extremes of which
Aristotle speaks, but they are not compromises in happiness.

Gallup, "Jane Austen and the Aristotelian Ethic,' 99-100.
" See, for instance, Ruderman, The Pleasures of Virtue, 37,71.
" Austen, Emma, 385.
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However, the simple observation of a connection between pleasure
and virtue does not present us with something that is uniquely
Aristotelian. The foregrounding of such a connection is equally
characteristic of both utilitarian and Humean ethics. Hume's affiliation
of the moral sentiments with pleasure and pain, for instance, enables us
to make double use of the evidence adduced in favor of the Aristotelian
analysis. The last several sections will be devoted to a Humean
interpretation of Austen, with a brief digression on the work of
Thomas WUliams, which follows immediately.

¥ IV ^
Williams has gotten down to cases and investigated Austen's portrayal
of vices. He has done so, he says, in order to reflect on "some of the
specifics of Austen's vision of the virtuous life" and intends to show
that Austen, as a moralist, provides "quite as good a jumping-off point
for reflection on the nitty-gritty of the virtuous life as Aristotle" does.'^
Jealousy and envy are the candidate vices. However, Williams's
approach is not particularly Aristotelian. An Aristotelian approach
might, for instance, treat vicious jealousy as an excessive reaction to
others receiving favors to which one is also, but not exclusively entitled.
In such a case, a deficiency might involve a failure to recognize or assert
one's own entitlement rather than a tendency to deny the entitlements
of others. This, in any event, might be how one could begin to consider
jealousy in an Aristotelian context. Williams does not do it. Instead, he
makes use of an account of jealousy by Daniel Farrell, which treats it as
an emotion rather than a behavioral disposition, offering an analysis of
the circumstances in which it might arise and a catalog of the desires and
cognitions which might be involved.'^ In fact, I entirely agree with
Williams' contention that Farrell's "analysis of emotion is not only
correct in the main but is also reflected in the usage of careful speakers
of English."^^

"Thomas Williams, "Moral Vice, Cognitive Virtue: Austen onJealousy and Envy," Philosophy
and Literature 17 (2003): 223-30,223.
" Daniel Farrell, "Jealousy," Philosophical Review 89 (1980): 527-59.
" Williams, "Moral Vice, Cognitive Virtue," 230 n2.
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I cannot think, however, that such an analysis provides much
insight into Aristotelian approaches. If jealousy is an emotion proper,
it is difficult to see how it would fit neatly into the ranks of the
Aristotelian vices. Williams says that: "Fanny Price is habitually jealous;
that is, she can be counted on to feel jealousy in a broad range of
situations. She is prone to interpret situations in a way that calls forth
jealous feelings. (Note that her habitual jealousy can be described with
equal accuracy as a cognitive and as an affective disposition: she is
disposed to see situations as being of a kind that characteristically
arouses jealousy, and she is disposed to feel jealousy in her reactions to
the situations so interpreted.)"^' But if jealousy is merely a disposition
to feel and think in certain ways, it isn't a behavioral disposition at all.
Further, it is not clear that the application of Farrell's analysis to
Austen's Fanny Price yields the conclusion with which Williams
presents us.
I will take issue with the contention that Fanny's alienation can be
linked to habitual jealousy or to any claim which draws a necessary
connection between the outsider status which Williams emphasizes in
his article and such a disposition. Fanny Price is, of course, jealous of
Mary Crawford, in that Mary is the recipient of Edmund Bertram's
attention and affection—attention that was formerly devoted to Fanny.
As Daniel Farrell points out, "the clearest cases of jealousy are cases
where A [Fanny] not only wants to be favored in some way over C
[Mary], but also believes that until now...she has been so favored."" It
is not this, but the claim of habitual jealousy that I wish to challenge.
Fanny's jealousy is described as not merely episodic but habitual,
something that is put down to the insecurity of her position, her lack
of confidence, and her diffidence.
When jealous, one is held to be bothered in any of several ways by
the very fact that one is (as one believes) not favored as one wants to be
favored. The emotion arises in a three-party context. Fanny is jealous
of Mary because the latter is favored by Edmund as Fanny herself
wishes to be (and tmtil recently, was) favored. But Mary is the only
individual of whom Fanny is jealous, and jealousy does not seem in any
other way to stem from Fanny's outsider status in the Bertram

" Willianis, "Moral Vice, Cognitive Virtue," 227.
" Farrell, "Jealousy," 530.
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household. No one else's favor is ever lost to another, for Fanny is
seldom favored. Nor does Fanny seem to wish to win the attention of
the others—it is usually something she shrinks from. She is embarrassed
and awkward when made much of or courted. I wouldn't call this a
jealous disposition, exactly, when there is only a single object whose
favor one craves, and only a single person who arouses the emotion.
I agree with Williams that jealousy sometimes makes Fanny acute.
One of Austen's greatest gifts is her ability to expose poor moral
reasoning and pathetic moral rationalization for what they are. In
Mansfield Park we sometimes see this through Fanny's eyes, as when she
observes with dismay Edmund's repeated attempts to demonstrate that
what Mary Crawford says is never what she really means. One carmot
read much of Austen without encountering some satirical depiction of
self-aggrandizement or self-justification. The exposure of moral foibles
and vices is her specialty. The problem is that Williams hasn't shown us
any. It is never Fanny's jealousy that is censured as a vice in Austen.
To be fair, this was not Williams's central aim. That aim was to
show how jealousy can act as an aid to discernment in Austen. I must
admit, however, that I am not sure how much really convincing
evidence there is for a general claim of this kind. For every Fanny Price
and Mr. Knightly who are sensitized and made acute by jealousy, there
is a Mary Musgrove who is as dimwitted as they are perceptive. And
neither Fanny nor Mr. Knightly are uniformly acute. Note, for
instance, the jealous Knightly's shifts in attitude toward Frank
Churchill: "He had found [Emma]...agitated and low. Frank Churchill
was a villain. He heard her declare that she had never loved him. Frank
Churchill's character was not so desperate. She was his own Emma, by
hand and word, when they returned into the house; and if he could
have thought of Frank Churchill then, he might have deemed him a
very good sort of fellow."'"' This is one of Mr. Knightley's more
appealing moments, but jealousy does not appear to be "an aid to
practical discernment," in this context at least.
Further, those cases in Austen in which it is clear that jealousy is
really being depicted as a vice rather than a forgivable psychological
condition militate outright against the claim that it is an aid to practical
discernment. Jealousy and envy really are vices in the unattractive Mary
* Aiuten, Emma, 344.
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Musgrove of Persuasion, who has only to hear of someone else's good
fortune in order to feel herself excluded or ill-used in not having been
a party to it. Yet Mary is clearly the least discerning character in the
novel, and Austen has a great deal of fun at her expense by laughing at
her inability to be honest with herself about her own motives. There is
hardly a case to be made here for jealousy as an aid to discernment if
that jealousy is to be characterized as a vice. Even if Austen's strength
as a writer is to be found in her perspicacious depiction of virtues and
vices, and I think it is, I do not believe Williams has provided an
adequate explanation of how Austen has managed it. In the remainder
of this paper, I will maintain that she has managed it by adopting a view
of virtue, vice, and human nature remarkably similar to that held by
David Hume.

* V *
As has been indicated in preceding sections, Anne Crippen Ruderman
has argued forcefully and effectively that pleasure is a friend of virtue in
Austen, and that pain is an adjunct of vice. It is not just that the most
virtuous characters end by being happiest, but that virtue rewards its
possessor in the short run by making her more adaptable and less
vulnerable to sensations of loss and feelings of ill-use. In Sense and
Sensibility, the virtues of self-control and forbearance make Elinor
Dashwood more capable of coping with the loss of her father and her
family's reduced circumstances than do her mother's and sister's selfindulgence. "They encouraged each other in the violence of their
affliction." Elinor, on the other hand, "was deeply afflicted; but still she
could struggle, she could exert herself."'" It is very clear that Elinor
suffers less, not because she loved her father any less, but because she
exercises self-restraint. In Mansfield Park, Fanny Price's humility and
patience and unselfishness serve her better than the vanity and greed of
Maria Bertram serve her, both in terms of the friends and lovers that
they attract and the courses their lives eventually take. Emma Woodhouse alleviates her pain and wretchedness over having behaved

Austen, Sense and Sensibility, 6.

Dense Insensibility

163

unkindly toward Miss Bates by performing an act of kindness in the
course of which she tends to the amusement of her sickly father: "A
whole evening of backgammon with her father was a felicity...
indeed, lay real pleasure, for there she was giving up the sweetest hours
of the twenty-four to his comfort."^^ Ruderman believes that examples
such as the preceding show that "Austen's indication that noble conduct
is intrinsically pleasant is more Aristotelian than modem."*' In this she
is mistaken, either for believing that no modem philosopher made such
assumptions or for believing that Aristotle necessarily places greater
emphasis on the connection between pleasure and virtue than would
any modern philosopher.
Pain and pleasure, according to David Hume, are inseparable from
vice and virtue. We are so constituted that "certain characters and
passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and
others in like manner excite a pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction
are not only inseparable from vice and virtue but constitute their very
nature and essence."** Pleasure and pain are held to be "the chief spring
or actuating principle of the human mind."*' For Hume, the source of
morality itself is to be found in sentiment, and sentiments can be
pleasant or painful: "whatever mental quality in ourselves or others
gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous;
as everything of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious."*' In other
words, "the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good and evil
is known, are nothing but particular pains and pleasures."*^ It is evident
that the connection between pleasure and virtue noted by Austen
scholars is a central tenet in Hume's ethical philosophy.

* VI ¥
Attention has been drawn to Austen's emphasis on sensibility and
emotion. Consider, for instance, Anne Elliot's telling distmst of Mr.
Austen, Emma, 299.
Ruderman, The Pleasures of Virtue, 37.
" Hume, Treatise, 296.
Hume, Treatise, 574.
^ Hume, Treatise, 574-575.
" Hume, Treatise. 471.
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Elliot: "Mr. Elliot was rational, discreet, polished—but he was not open.
There was never any burst of feeling, any warmth of indignation or
delight, at the evil or good of others. This, to Anne, was a decided
imperfection."'*' The preceding need not signify some blanket condem
nation of reserve which retroactively censures both Mr. Darcy of Pride
and Prejudice and Mr. Knightly of Emma!'^ First, the reserve of each
cannot be taken to reflect an attitude which disapproves or opposes
openness and warmth, given that each has chosen an open, warm wife.
But openness is not the point in any case, at least not if we understand
it to imply some form of extroversion. Only two of Austen's heroines
could be described as extroverts: Emma Woodhouse and Elizabeth
Bennet. Anne Elliot and Fanny Price fall decidedly into the introverted
camp.
What is really at issue is "indignation or delight at the evil or good
of others." That is, this seems to concern spontaneous moral emotions
and a willingness to make judgments on their basis. Even Darcy and
Knightly, the most reserved characters, experience no difficulty
whatsoever in voicing their indignation about the behavior of their
rivals, Wickham and Churchill. Characters are condemned in Austen,
not for reserve, but for a failure to respond emotionally to virtue and
vice. Many such responses are private, of course, and characters can also
be deceived about that to which they do respond, so misunderstandings
are always possible. Indeed, a series of such mistakes is what initially
separates Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy. But even though misunder
standings of this kind occur, the virtuous characters are always found
to have had "proper feelings."'® And even though heroines like Anne
Elliot and Fanny Price are usually restrained in their public expression
of emotion, they experience strong emotions nonetheless, and when
these involve moral approbation and disapprobation they do not
trouble to conceal them.
It is, in fact, Mary Crawford's failure to feel any genuine moral
disapproval about her brother's adulterous liaison with Maria Rushworth that leads Edmund to make a final break with her: "she saw it

" Austen, Persuasion, 153.
** See Ruderman, The Pleasures of Virtue, 105 and Tony Tanner, Jane Austen (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986), 231.
" See Ruderman, The Pleasures of Virtue, 63, on Austen's use of this phrase.
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only as folly, and that folly stamped only by exposure...it was the
detection, not the offence, which she reprobated."More significant still
is Edmund's reference to Mary's lack of appropriate emotion in the
course of the same passage: "so voluntarily, so freely, so coolly to
canvas it!—No reluctance, no horror...no modest loathings!"^' Indeed,
Mary has already aroused a similar response from Fanny Price. Fanny
refuses Mary's offer to convey her to Mansfield Park, even though she
very much wants to go, because the offer is made in the course of a
letter which is a veritable masterpiece of self-exposure. In it, Mary
laments Tom Bertram's ill health, but comforts herself and Fanny with
the thought of Edmund (whom she hopes to marry) succeeding to
Tom's honors. In refusing the favor, Fanny believes that "it would have
been a material drawback to be owing such felicity to persons in whose
feelings...she saw so much to condemn."'^
A failure to respond to events with proper moral feeling is a
genuine failure of character. Such a stance seems to require an accoimt
of morality which allies it with emotion. For David Hume, of course,
morality arises not from reason," but from sentiment." To be literally
impervious to the moral sentiments, or to be able to quell or ignore
them, shows that there is something seriously wrong: "these sentiments
are so rooted in our constitution and temper," says Hume, "that
without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness,
'tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them."" Only an ethical stance
like Hume's, a stance that allies morality with sentiment, can make full
sense of the references to "proper feeling" that we find in Austen.

^ VII *
Moral sentiments can be produced by the principle of sympathy,"
Hume indicates, and this is a principle whose workings can be seen
everywhere in Austen's novels, though it is seldom explicitly men" Austen, Mansfield Park, 355.
" Austen, Mansfield Park, 340. Emphasis mine.
" Hume, Treatise, 455.
" Hume, Treatise, 470.
" Hume, Treatise, 474.
" Hume, Treatise, 577.
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tioned. When we become aware of "the effects of a passion in the voice
and gesture of any person," our minds will pass "from these effects to
their causes, forming such a vivid idea of the emotion that we will end
by experiencing it ourselves."'^ Sympathy is not an emotion like pity,
but a mprhani«im that makes this transfer or sharing of emotions
possible. In other words, our awareness of the feelings of another can
sometimes lead us to share them.
This mechanism is constantly at work in Austen. In Persuasion,
we're given a very accurate picture of Aime Elliot's awareness of the
causes and effects of an emotion through her awareness of the mental
states of others. This occurs when she sees her sister cut Captain
Wentworth: "It grieved Anne to observe that Elizabeth would not
know him.She saw that he saw Elizabeth, that Elizabeth saw him, that
there was complete internal recognition on each side; she was convinced
that he was ready to be acknowledged as an acquaintance, expecting it,
and she had the pain of seeing her sister turn away with unalterable
coldness."'® In Sense and Sensibility, we see the phenomenon of shared
emotion, as even the usually restrainedElinor shares Marianne's distress
about Willoughby's desertion: "Marianne stretched on the bed, almost
choked by grief....Elinor drew near, but without saying a word; and
seating herself on the bed, took her hand...and then gave way to a burst
of tears, which at first was scarcely less violent than Marianne's."" As
Hume indicates, "the minds of men are mirrors to one another.""*
When apprised of Tom'sdangerous illness by the Bertrams, Fanny Price
"felt truly for them all."'* Catherine Moreland weeps in sympathy with
her brother's disappointment as she reads his account of Isabella
Thorpe's perfidy." But the exercise of sympathy can involve pleasure
as well as pain, as when good spirits like Catherine Moreland's prove
infectious: "Mr. and Mrs. Allen were sorry to lose their young friend,
whose good humor and cheerfulness had made her a valuable compan-
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ion, and in the promotion of whose enjoyment their own had been
gently increased.""
Hume even describes a case in which we may be led to sympathize
with someone who is, in fact, unmoved.We respond to what we believe
the general run of people who behave in that way or who find
themselves in those circumstances would be feeling: "we blush," says
Hume "for the conduct of those, who behave themselves foolishly
before us; and that tho' they show no sense of shame, nor seem in the
least conscious of their folly. All this proceeds from sympathy.""
Elizabeth Bennet is regularly embarrassed by the conduct of her
oblivious parent in just this way, and is often described as "blushing for
her mother."" Similarly, Catherine Moreland is said to blush for
Isabella Thorpe, who is entirely untroubled by her own conduct," and
Henry Tilney is said to have "blushed for the narrow-minded counsel
[of his unrepentant father] which he was obliged to expose.""

^ VIII ^
But something further is required for genuinely moral sentiments.
Hume maintains that sympathy which is not regulated by what he
refers to as a "general point of view" will not necessarily lead one to
experience moral approbation and disapprobation. That is, a sympa
thetic response cannot, by itself, guarantee emotional reactions which
ahgn with moral judgments. What is required is the adoption of a
"general point of view" which allows us to "correct" our sympathetic
responses.^' Adoption of such a point of view can compensate for the
remoteness of the object of attention, given a natural tendency to
sympathize more strongly with acquaintances than with strangers." It
helps us to take into account the tendencies of a character in addition
to its actual effects, so as to compensate for circumstances which
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prevent the exercise of some particular disposition/® We attempt to
observe an individual's traits from within the perspective of that
person's narrow circle, by taking up the attitude of that circle toward
him or her.
We can see from the preceding that proper moral feeling does not
depend on a surrender to spontaneous emotion, but that it requires
instead an adjustment of initial sentiments. This is an adjustment which
Austen's heroines frequently make. The most telling examples,
however, lie in Austen's survey of the diverse modes of character
assessment that can be employed by different people. Austen compares
different methods used in the evaluation of an individual's character. In
some, the evaluator's sentiments are unregulated. In others, they are
regulated by the very point of view whose adoption Hume advocates.
This is evident in any comparison of assessments of character made
by Elizabeth Bennet and by her mother. Mrs. Bennet's assessment of
Darcy, based on initial and hasty resentment, remains impervious to
evidence or observation until she discovers that he will marry Elizabeth,
at which point she executes a complete volte-face. The only effects of
character that enter into her sudden approbation involve the probable
effects of Darcy's wealth. Elizabeth's disapproval of Darcy begins with
his slighting her and with Wickham's lies, but slowly changes as she
hears from Colonel Fitzwilliam and from Darcy's housekeeper Mrs.
Reynolds of (what Hume would call) his effects on hisimmediate circle.
She discovers his kindness to his tenants, his care for his sister, and his
loyalty to his friends. Of course, the effects of Darcy's character are
soon felt in Elizabeth's own circle, and she later learns from her uncle
Gardiner of Darcy's rescue of Lydia.
We see this again when we consider the different assessments of
Mr. Rushworth's character made by the denizens of Mansfield Park.
Mrs. Norris and Maria Bertram concern themselves only with Rushworth's income and property. Edmund's assessment is based on
inhabiting Rushworth's narrow circle and observing the tendencies of
his character: "no representation of his aunt's could induce him to find
Mr. Rushworth a desirable companion. He could allow his sister to be
the best judge of her own happiness, but he was not pleased that her
happiness should centre in a large income; nor could he refrain from
" Hume, Treatise, 584-585.
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often saying to himself, in Mr. Rushworth's company, *If this man had
not twelve thousand a year, he would be a very stupid fellow.'"^'

* IX ^
Neither Austen nor Hume condemn pride categorically as a vice. Both
acknowledge a sense in which there can be a proper pleasure in one's
achievements and abilities, and another sense in which pride becomes
contemptible. Hume considers both pride and hmnility in terms of "the
vice or virtue that lies in their excesses or just proportion," sounding
positively Aristotelian as he does so. "An excessive pride or over
weening conceit of ourselves is always esteem'd vicious, and is univer
sally hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteem'd
virtuous, and procures the good will of every-one."''^ Likewise, as
Ruderman indicates, Austen writes frequently of proper and improper
pride. There is Elinor Dashwood's "reasonable and laudable pride," and
Elizabeth Rennet's ultimate happy certainty of Darcy's having "no
improper pride."" Anne Elliot of Persuasion sets her own proper pride
at odds with her family's sycophantic attentions to distant relatives of
higher rank: "I suppose...! have more pride than any of you; but I
confess it does vex me, that we should be so solicitous to have the
relationship acknowledged, which we may be sure is a matter of perfect
indifference to them....! am certainly proud, too proud to enjoy a
welcome which depends entirely upon place.""
Improper pride, on the other hand, is something of which both
Hume and Austen offer acerbic critiques. There is, for instance, pride
in wealth and rank, and the kind of economic and class snobbery that
go with it: "As we are proud of riches in ourselves," says Hume, "so to
satisfy our vanity we desire that every one, who has any connexion
with us, shou'd likewise be possest of them, and are asham'd of any one
that is mean or poor among our friends and relations. For this reason
we remove the poor as far from us as possible; and as we cannot prevent
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poverty in some distant collaterals, and our forefathers are taken to be
our nearest relations; upon this account every one affects to be of a
good family, and to be descended from a long succession of rich and
honourable ancestors."" Consider, against this backdrop. Sir Walter
Elliot's outrage at Anne's choosing to spend the evening with her old
schoolfellow Mrs. Smith instead of joining the family in their attentions
to Lady Dalrymple: "and who is Miss Anne Elliot to be visiting in
Westgate Buildings?—A Mrs. Smith. A widow Mrs. Smith. And who
was her husband? One of the five thousand Mr. Smiths whose names are
to be met with everywhere. And what is her attraction? That she is old
and sickly.—Upon my word, Miss Anne Elliot, you have the most
extraordinary taste! Everything that revolts other people, low company,
paltry rooms...disgusting associations are inviting to you....A poor
widow, barely able to five, between thirty and forty —a mere Mrs.
Smith, an everyday Mrs. Smith, of all people and all names in the
world, to be the chosen friend of Miss Anne Elliot, and to be preferred
by her to her own family connections among the nobility of England
and Ireland!""
There are even closer parallels between Hume and Austen. For
instance, Hume goes on to point out that "Every thing belonging to a
vain man is the best that is any where to be found. His houses,
equipage, furniture, cloaths, horses, hounds, excel all others in his
conceit; and 'tis easy to observe, that from the least advantage in any of
these, he draws a new subject of pride and vanity. His wine, if you'll
believe him, has a finer flavour than any other; his cookery is more
exquisite; his table more orderly; his servants more expert; the air, in
which he lives, more healthful; the soil he cultivates more fertile; his
fruits ripen earlier and to greater perfection."" Compare to this the
professions of Anne Elliot's father and sister as they welcome her to
their lodgings in Bath: "Their house was undoubtedly the best in
Camden Place; their drawing-rooms had many decided advantages over
all the others which they had either seen or heard of; and the superior
ity was not less in the style of fitting up, or the taste of the furniture.""
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There are, of course, a great many other examples of improper
pride in Austen. General Tilney of Northanger Abbey, Lady Catherine
de Bourgh of Pride and Prejudice, and Mrs. Ferrars and her daughter of
Sense and Sensibility all exhibit an inappropriate pride on accoxmt of
rank and wealth and all get their comeuppance in the pages of Austen's
work. The officious, interfering ways of Lady Catherine and of Mrs.
Norris of Mansfield Park fall under the heading of Hume's latter
observations on pride. It is not their wine which excels all others, but
their judgment and their capacity to organize everyone else's life.
Without attempting a survey of all the vices which Austen and
Hume hold up for ridicule and censure, it may be of interest to
investigate one more. Consider envy, for instance, said by Hume to be
"excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison
diminishes our own."^ In Austen's Persuasion, the prospect of other
people's happiness makes Mary Musgrove miserable, whenever she is
not to partake of it herself. Missing dinner with her husband's parents
when her child is injured does not distress her until her husband
announces his intention of attending. His prospect of pleasure casts her
circumstances at home in the worst possible light by comparison: "So
here he is to go away and enjoy himself, and because I am the poor
mother, I am not to be allowed to stir—and yet, I am sure, I am more
unfit than anybody else to be about the child."'®
Hume pays particular attention to "that species of envy, which
men feel, when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking
them in the pursuit of glory or happiness....A man, who compares
himself to his inferior, receives a pleasure from the comparison: And
when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior, what
shou'd only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain, by
new comparison with its preceding condition."" This is distinctly
reminiscent of Mrs. Norris's real irritation at any improvement in the
treatment or consideration of Faimy Price at Mansfield Park. Fanny's
inferior status is impressed upon her from the beginning of her stay
with the Bertrams, since it is the intention of her relations always "to
make her remember that she is not a Miss Bertram." It is believed that
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Fanny and the Bertram girls "caimot be equals. Their rank, fortune,
rights, and expectations will always be different."*^ Fanny is ensconced
at Mansfield in the role of poor relation. And Mrs. Norris is determined
to perpetuate that state of affairs. The purchase of a mareso as to enable
Fanny to ride is bitterly opposed by Mrs. Norris: "She could not but
consider it as absolutely unnecessary, and even improper, that Fanny
should have a regular lady's horse of her own in the style of her cousins.
She was sure that Sir Thomas had never intended it."'^ Mrs. Norris
objects to Fanny's being included in an excursion to Sotherton.®'* She is
"intent on lessening her niece's pleasure...as much as possible"'' when
Fanny is invited to dine with the Grants, warning her that she ought
not to be "fancying that the invitation is meant as any particular
compliment to you-, the compliment is intended to your uncle and aunt,
and me. Mrs. Grant thinks it a civility due to us to take a little notice of
you...and you may be very certain, that if your cousin Julia had been
at home, you would not have been asked at all."" Mrs. Norris is almost
beside herself with irritation at a carriage's being called to take Fanny
to that dinner. Her objections proving ineffective, she comforts herself
with the thought that the carriage was sent for "upon Edmund's
account."'^ When Sir Thomas decides to hold a dance for Faimy and her
brother, Mrs. Norris's "surprise and vexation required some minutes
silence to be settled into composure."" This behavior continues
throughout the novel. It is Hume's account of envy which best explains
this sequence of reactions to any improvement in Fanny's fortunes on
the part of Mrs. Norris.

* X *
It should not be forgotten that all of Austen's novels are romances
which end happily in matrimony. Unusual for the period during which
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they wrote, both Hume and Austen portrayed the happiest marriages
as relationships between equals. Although he laughs at women's love of
power and control, just as Austen does when depicting the domineering
Lady Catherine and Mrs. Ferrars, Hume acknowledges that "it is the
fault of our sex if the women be so fond of rule...if we did not abuse our
authority, they would never think it worth while to dispute it." Hume
wishes that "there were no pretensions to authority on either side; but
that every thing was carried on with perfect equality, as between two
equal members of the same body.""Indeed, he contends that masculine
sovereignty is "a real usurpation, and destroys the nearness of rank, not
to say equality, which nature has established between the sexes. We are
by nature...[women's] lovers, their friends, their patrons: would we
willingly exchange such endearing apellations, for the barbarous title of
master and tyrant?"'® Marriage, for Hume, "chiefly subsists by
friendship.""
Austen's insights into such matters are similar to Hume's. Mr.
Knightly speaks to Emma Woodhouse of their "having every right that
equal worth can give to be happy together."" Elizabeth Beimet
contends that it was her very lack of servility, her unwillingness to treat
him as a superior being, that first aroused Darcy's admiration: "the fact
is, that you were sick of civility, of deference, of officious attention.
You were disgusted with the women who were always speaking and
looking and thinking for your approbation alone.""
Friendship is what makes good marriages possible for Hume, even
when they are less than passionate, or when passion has faded. Friend
ship "is a calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason and cemented
by habit; springing from long acquaintance...without jealousies and
fears....We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the marriage-knot,
which chiefly subsists by friendship.""Just so is Marianne Dashwood
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said to be born to counteract her favorite maxims concerning grand
passion, and to enter into a very happy and successful marriage "with
no sentiment superior to strong esteem and lively friendship.""
But the best example of the kind of marriage which Hume and
Austen find admirable is to be found in Austen's Persuasion. The
married couple which Anne Elliot most likes and admires, Admiral and
Mrs. Croft, are lovers and friends between whom "everything is carried
on with perfect equality."" Mrs. Croft scolds her brother for speaking
"as if women were all fine ladies, instead of rational creatures,"" and
always sails with her husband. "As long as we could be together," she
told Mrs. Musgrove, "nothing ever ailed me."" Admiral and Mrs. Croft
are friends and partners, and operate in tandem. They even treat the
driving of their gig as a cooperative venture. "Anne, with some
amusement at their style of driving," regards it as "no bad representa
tion of the general guidance of their affairs.""
For reasons such as these, I believe that the ethical system into
which Austen's endorsements and prohibitions best fit is that espoused
by David Hume. Granted, there are Aristotelian elements in Austen's
writing, but Hume's own work is not devoid of the occasional
Aristotelian element. Treating virtue as a disposition and a mean
between extremes is only Aristotelian because Aristotle thought of
these things first, not because no one followed his example. As we have
seen, Hume did not neglect either point in the Treatise,though they do
not constitute the principal focus of his own account. The association
and interdependence of virtue with happiness and pleasure can befound
in the writings of both philosophers. But beyond this, there is also
considerable evidence of commonality between Hume and Austen in
which Aristotelian insights play no part. Their views on how particular
vices can manifest in real life, on marriage, on moral feeling and the
assessment of character, all tip the balance in favor of the hypothesis
that Austen's novels embrace a Humean ethic.
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